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Context
The facts:
Climate policy is one of the corner stones of European Union (EU) policy
European Commission has defined a roadmap with an objective of 80-95% GHG
reduction in 2050 compared to 1990 levels
Carbon Capture and Sequestration technologies are considered as potential
backstop technologies (up to 14% of total abatements according to IEA)
CCS deployment is highly uncertain with technical, social and legislative issues
Questions:
1 How to share the abatements or allocations? How to design a fair agreement
among EU countries?
2 How each country will use its allocations on the horizon 2020-2050? What will
be the associated costs for each country?
3 What impacts of CCS uncertainty on such agreements?
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Objective and methodology
Propose a robust meta-game approach for assessing burden sharing agreements among
the 28 EU-countries for the attainment of EU 2050 climate target.
Methodology:
1 Identify a global emissions budget on 2020-2050 compatible with EU objectives
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2 Estimate abatement cost functions for each EU country using simulations of the
Computable General Equilibrium model GEMINI-E3
3 Define a meta-game in which each country minimizes its costs according to a
global share of allocations
4 Derive a robust/stochastic framework to analyze uncertainty on:
Meta-modelling approximations -¿ robust optimization
deployment of CCS technologies -¿ stochastic programming
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A noncooperative meta-game approach
Assumptions:
1 A safety emissions budget Bud is distributed among the players. Let θj ∈ (0, 1)
be the share of player j , with
∑m
j=1 θj = 1.
2 A competitive market for emissions permits, which clears at each period. Let
ωtj be the vector of permits for country j at period t.
3 An exogenous rate of CCS penetration. We denote ccstj the amount of
emissions of country j sequestered at period t at cost C t and ccstj the upper
bound for sequestration for country j at period t.
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A noncooperative meta-game approach
Input Global budget Bud and allocations among countries (i.e., θj )
Model Minimize the economic impacts for each country by deciding:
1 How to use the budget on the horizon
2 Permit sales and buyings on the EU trading market
3 CO2 sequestered
Output Emissions, Permit exchanges, Permit prices, Percentage of welfare losses, ...
⇒ By testing different allocations, one can find a fair burden sharing. For example if
we adopt a Rawlsian approach to distributive justice, the optimal game design problem
consists in finding the θj ’s in such a way that one minimizes the largest welfare loss
among the countries.
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Maximizing welfare
Then we consider the game where each player j controls the permit allocations
schedule (ωtj : t = 0, . . . ,T − 1) with Ωt =
∑m
j=1 ω
t
j and tries to achieve
max
ωj ,ccsj≤ccs j
{
T−1∑
t=0
βtj (pi
t
j (e
t
j (Ω
t )) + pt (Ωt )(ωtj − etj (Ωt ) + ccstj )− C tccstj
}
,
subject to actions chosen by the other
players and under the budget sharing
constraint
T−1∑
t=0
ωtj ≤ θjBud. (1)
Here pitj (e
t
j ) represents the economic
benefits obtained from emissions by
country j , at time t.
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A Nash equilibrium
Applying standard Kuhn-Tucker multiplier method, with multipliers νj , the first order
necessary conditions for a Nash equilibrium are now
0 = βtj (pi
t
j
′
(etj (Ω
t )) + pt
′
(Ωt )(ωtj − etj (Ωt )− ccstj )− C t − νj (2)
t = 0, . . . ,T − 1; j = 1, . . . ,m.
0 = νj (θjBud−
T−1∑
t=0
ωtj ) (3)
0 ≤ θjBud−
T−1∑
t=0
ωtj (4)
0 ≤ ccs j − ccsj (5)
0 ≤ νj . (6)
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Estimation of the abatement cost functions
We use the CGE model GEMINI-E3 as a the provider of data for the estimation
of the abatement cost functions for each EU country
Estimations are based on statistical emulations of a sample of 200 GEMINI-E3
numerical simulations (4 periods ×28 = nb estimations)
The abatement costs are polynomial functions of degree 4 in the country
abatement level
ACj (t) = α
j
1(t) qj (t) + α
j
2 qj (t)
2 + αj3(t) qj (t)
3 + αj4(t) qj (t)
4. (7)
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Results without CCS - Different sharing rules
Historical Ability Population Fair
emissions to pay rule Equilibrium
AUT 1.90 1.11 1.70 1.85
BEL 3.10 2.74 2.10 3.27
BGR 1.20 1.69 1.50 0.83
CYP 0.20 0.53 0.20 0.42
CZE 3.10 3.89 2.10 1.38
DEU 20.80 11.80 16.10 13.81
DNK 1.30 2.12 1.10 1.85
EST 0.50 0.71 0.30 0.40
FIN 1.70 1.59 1.10 1.50
FRA 9.60 6.75 12.80 12.15
GBR 13.10 13.56 12.30 14.82
GRC 2.20 7.99 2.20 5.05
HRV 0.50 0.88 0.90 0.85
HUN 1.30 1.49 2.00 1.30
IRL 1.00 1.43 0.90 1.43
ITA 10.60 8.29 11.90 11.72
LAT 0.20 0.36 0.40 0.30
LIT 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.30
LUX 0.30 0.63 0.10 0.56
MLT 0.10 0.15 0.10 0.13
NLD 5.10 3.81 3.30 4.40
POL 8.50 12.25 7.60 6.22
POR 1.30 1.51 2.10 1.50
ROU 2.10 2.89 4.20 1.93
SPN 7.20 9.54 9.10 8.95
SVK 1.00 1.20 1.10 0.84
SVN 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.46
SWE 1.40 0.19 1.90 1.79
EU-28 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
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Results without CCS - welfare losses
Historical Ability Population Fair
emissions to pay rule Equilibrium
AUT 0.84 4.14 1.67 1.05
BEL 1.59 2.69 4.60 1.08
BGR -10.52 -26.19 -20.01 1.16
CYP 15.37 -6.54 15.37 1.05
CZE -15.67 -23.55 -5.82 1.24
DEU -1.90 2.17 0.22 1.25
DNK 3.89 -0.36 4.92 1.05
EST -5.70 -20.04 7.86 1.20
FIN -0.10 0.58 3.59 1.13
FRA 2.58 4.13 0.85 1.20
GBR 1.95 1.75 2.30 1.20
GRC 12.36 -10.39 12.36 1.18
HRV 8.67 0.62 0.09 1.16
HUN 1.03 -0.68 -5.11 1.03
IRL 4.24 1.12 4.97 1.13
ITA 1.95 3.51 1.08 1.21
LAT 5.77 -1.55 -3.36 1.21
LIT -1.83 -1.91 -8.03 1.27
LUX 8.55 -1.09 14.36 1.01
MLT 6.79 -2.06 6.79 1.14
NLD -0.59 2.37 3.52 1.01
POL -5.60 -16.90 -2.92 1.18
POR 2.18 1.03 -2.28 1.07
ROU -0.11 -6.01 -15.78 1.15
SPN 2.98 0.62 1.06 1.21
SVK -1.49 -4.73 -3.13 1.12
SVN 2.91 0.27 2.91 1.20
SWE 2.65 6.89 0.87 1.26
EU-28 1.18 1.18 1.19 1.18
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Robust optimization
Consider the constraint
∑
j aj xj ≤ 0 where aj are uncertain and the uncertain model
for aj .
aj = a
0
j + ajξj
a0j is the nominal value and ξ is the uncertainty factor acting through aj .
The uncertain constraint is∑
j
a0j xj︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
∑
j
aj xjξj︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤ 0.
certain uncertain
(8)
In addition, we define an uncertainty set which contains reasonable realizations of
uncertainties that we want to consider
U = {ξ : (
∑
i
ξ2i )
1
2 ≤ κ, −1 ≤ ξi ≤ 1}
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Equivalent robust counterpart with an ellipsoidal set
Set zk =
∑
i a
k
i xi . The robust counterpart of the uncertain constraint is∑
i
a0i xi + max
ξ
{
∑
k
zkξk : ||ξ||2 ≤ κ, −1 ≤ ξk ≤ 1} ≤ 0.
The dual of the inner maximization problem is
min
u
(||u||1 + κ||z − u||2) .
The equivalent robust counterpart of the uncertain constraint is∑
i
a0i xi + minu
(||u||1 + κ||z − u||2) ≤ 0.
If the constraint is embedded in an optimization problem, we can drop the min
operator and let the overall optimization scheme manage the auxiliary variable u∑
i
a0i xi + ||u||1 + κ||z − u||2 ≤ 0.
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Applying RO to MAC
In order to extract robust predictions from the game meta-model we robustify the
marginal abatement cost represented by the following expression:
MAC tj =
∂
∂qtj
AC tj (9)
where AC tj is assumed to be given by a polynomial of degree 4,
∑4
i=1 α
t
ij (q
t
j )
i .
Let α¯tij be this estimate and αˆ
t
ij be the estimate error, we describe the uncertain
coefficients as linear functions of an underlying random factor ξtj
αtij = α¯
t
ij + ξ
t
ij αˆ
t
ij
Let us consider the following uncertainty set
Ξtj = {ξ :
4∑
i=1
|ξtij |2 ≤ k2}.
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Robust counterpart
MAC now depends on ξ. The worst case of the marginal abatement cost function is
given by
MAC
t
j =
4∑
i=1
iα¯tij (q
t
j )
i−1 + k
√√√√ 4∑
i=1
(iαˆtij (q
t
j )
i−1)2.
Theorem (Ben-Tal, El Ghaoui and Nemirovski)
Let ξi , i = 1, . . . , n be independent random variables with values in interval [−1, 1]
and with average zero: E(ξi ) = 0. If zi , i = 1, . . . , n, are deterministic coefficients, we
have for all k ≥ 0
Prob
{
ξ |∑ni=1 ziξi > k√∑ni=1 z2i } ≤ exp(− k22.5 ).
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Impacts on permit prices ($ per tC) - 96%
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Event tree for CCS uncertainty
2020 2030 2040 2050
Optimistic scenario (1/3)
Medium scenario (1/3)
Pessimistic scenario (1/3)
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CCS assumptions
Assuming that CCS technologies will be implemented only on gas and coal power
plants, we define three contrasted scenarios of CCS deployment
Optimistic: The cost of CCS is 200 $/tC and CCS technologies are expected to
sequester all emissions from gas and coal power plants in 2050.
Medium: The cost of CCS is 400 $/tC and CCS technologies are expected to
sequester half of emissions from gas and coal power plants in 2050. These
assumptions are those that have been used in the deterministic scenario.
Pessimistic: The cost of CCS is 600 $/tC and CCS technologies are expected to
sequester quarter of emissions from gas and coal power plants in 2050.
Finally the penetration rate is assumed to be linear between 2030 and 2050.
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A stochastic dynamic game
0 = βtj (pi
t
j
′
(etj (Ω
t )) + pt
′
(Ωt )(ωtj − etj (Ωt ))−
∑
s∈S
P(s)νj (s), ∀t < t¯, ∀j . (10)
0 = βtj (pi
t
j
′
(etj (Ω
t ), s) + pt
′
(Ωt , s)(ωtj (s)− etj (Ωt , s)− ccstj (s))− C tj (s) (11)
−νj (s), ∀t ≥ t¯, ∀j , ∀s ∈ S . (12)
0 = νj (s)(θjBud−
∑
t<t¯
ωtj −
∑
t≥t¯
ωtj (s)) ∀j , ∀s ∈ S (13)
0 ≤ θjBud−
∑
t<t¯
ωtj −
∑
t≥t¯
ωtj (s) ∀j , ∀s ∈ S (14)
0 ≤ ccstj (s)− ccstj (s), ∀t ≥ t¯, ∀s ∈ S (15)
0 ≤ νj (s), ∀j , ∀s ∈ S . (16)
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Results with stochastic CCS - Equilibrium
Burden Welfare losses
Sharing Average Optimistic Medium Pessimistic
AUT 1.82 0.51 0.07 0.58 0.89
BEL 3.24 0.50 0.11 0.54 0.86
BGR 0.79 0.56 -0.42 0.57 1.53
CYP 0.40 0.53 -1.04 0.87 1.75
CZE 1.31 0.51 0.11 0.30 1.12
DEU 13.59 0.52 0.03 0.57 0.96
DNK 1.60 0.53 -0.51 0.63 1.46
EST 0.43 0.52 0.86 0.65 0.06
FIN 1.64 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.48
FRA 12.63 0.53 0.24 0.58 0.77
GBR 15.20 0.50 0.20 0.53 0.78
GRC 4.60 0.49 -1.32 0.82 1.96
HRV 0.87 0.51 0.24 0.56 0.74
HUN 1.26 0.54 0.04 0.60 1.00
IRL 1.34 0.50 -0.30 0.61 1.20
ITA 12.10 0.51 0.22 0.55 0.76
LAT 0.30 0.50 -0.06 0.60 0.96
LIT 0.29 0.54 -0.09 0.60 1.12
LUX 0.53 0.47 -0.56 0.65 1.31
MLT 0.13 0.50 -0.72 0.77 1.46
NLD 4.00 0.50 -0.32 0.59 1.24
POL 6.35 0.53 0.45 0.47 0.67
POR 1.45 0.48 -0.03 0.54 0.94
ROU 1.97 0.54 0.36 0.54 0.72
SPN 8.95 0.50 0.06 0.56 0.89
SVK 0.86 0.54 0.31 0.58 0.73
SVN 0.46 0.52 0.09 0.57 0.92
SWE 1.90 0.52 1.26 0.09 0.21
EU-28 100.00 0.51 0.12 0.55 0.87
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Results with stochastic CCS - Emissions
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Figure: Emisisons in stochastic scenarios (in MtCO2)
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